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Meek v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court: Whether Medical 
Write-offs Can Be Considered in Post-trial Hearings Under 
Montana’s Collateral Source Rule 
 
Carolyn Gibadlo 
 
No: OP 14-0786 
Montana Supreme Court 
 
Oral Argument: Wednesday, March 11, 2015 at 9:30 AM in the 
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice 
Building, Helena, Montana. The matter was taken into advisement at 
about 10:45 AM.  
 
I. PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT TO THE COURT 
 
Jeffrey Winter argued that Justice Oldenburg’s Order violated 
Montana’s common law collateral source rule and Montana law1 and that 
the Defendants’ argument attempts to avoid the collateral source rule. 
Several justices asked Winter to clarify how lower courts should reduce 
damages to a reasonable value if juries consider the full amount charged. 
Winter reminded the Court that under Montana common law, unlike 
some other jurisdictions, a victim incurs liability for medical expenses at 
the time of service. Therefore, the full amount charged is the amount that 
should be used by juries to determine the reasonable value, and that 
amount can be reduced post trial by the amount actually paid. However, 
the difference in the amount charged and the amount paid should not be 
offset because the injured party suffered harm for that amount when they 
incurred liability. Furthermore, the difference in the amount paid and the 
amount charged is not a payment—it is a write-off.  
Write-offs are not subject to Montana’s collateral source statute, 
which allows for damages to be reduced in post-trial reduction. 
According to Montana common law, the collateral source rule should be 
interpreted narrowly. Both the Restatement2 and Montana common law 
support a finding for the plaintiff when an application of the collateral 
source rule will reduce damages. The Court asked Winter to clarify the 
approach taken by the Restatement which addresses damages in multiple 
sections in different contexts. The Court noted that according to § 911 a 
person cannot receive damages for an amount greater than the amount 
paid, unless the reduced amount is intended to be a gift. Winter agreed 
that some courts have relied on § 911, but he argued that in this case § 
920 and § 924 are more appropriate because they address when medical 
                                         
1
 Mont. Code Ann. § 27–1–308 (2013). 
2
 Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 911, 920, 924 (1965). 
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expenses are incurred, rather than the amount of damages paid. Winter 
argued that § 920 and § 924, as well as the Court’s holding in Winter v. 
State Farm,3 correctly find that the victim incurs medical expenses at the 
time of service, which should therefore be the reasonable value of 
damages.  
Anders Blewett argued on behalf of amicus Montana Trial 
Lawyers Association. He encouraged the Court to focus on the 
evidentiary exclusion of the amount charged rather than the collateral 
source reductions lower courts impose post trial per the collateral source 
rule. When asked by Justice McKinnon why the jury should not receive 
all of the information—the amount paid as well as the amount charged—
Blewett argued that the collateral source statute prohibits the jury from 
considering evidence of collateral sources. He conceded that in a 
minority of jurisdictions the evidence of the amount paid as well as the 
amount charged is considered by the jury. However, according to 
Blewett, Montana common law and statutes support the approach 
adopted by the majority of jurisdictions which excludes from evidence 
the amount paid.  
The justices asked Blewett to explain how defense counsel could 
challenge the reasonable value of medical damages without submitting 
evidence of the amount accepted by the provider. Blewett suggested 
defenses including fraud, mistake, code errors, or using cross 
examination to question the amounts. Blewett agreed with the Court that 
if defense counsel established the proper foundation, and did not 
introduce evidence of write-offs, pre-negotiated terms, or amounts 
accepted, an expert could testify that the market value of the billed 
services is actually less. However, he encouraged the Court to ask the 
question in the reverse: how can the plaintiff prove the reasonable value 
of medical expenses when only the amount paid is allowed into 
evidence? When asked if the Court should adopt § 920, Blewett 
answered affirmatively. He reasoned that § 920 prevents the collateral 
source benefit from flowing away from the tort victim and to the 
tortfeasor resulting in a windfall for the tortfeasor.  
 
II. RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT TO THE COURT 
 
Cathy Lewis argued on behalf of the Defendants that no party 
ever incurred liability for the charged amount and the only liability 
incurred was for the amount later paid. Under Montana law, damages are 
limited to an amount which compensates for detriment. Detriment must 
be a loss or harm suffered. In this case, the only liability incurred, and 
therefore detriment suffered, was the amount paid and damages must be 
limited to this amount.  
                                         
3
 328 P.3d 665 (Mont. 2014).   
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Justice Cotter asked Lewis if the Defendants’ argument violated 
the collateral source statute since the payments were a collateral source. 
Lewis agreed that the amount paid was a collateral source. However, she 
argued that under Montana law damages must be limited to the amount 
otherwise recoverable. For damages to be otherwise recoverable the 
injured party must have incurred liability for the entire amount. 
Therefore, under Montana law the damages must be limited to the 
amount paid—the amount for which the injured party incurred liability. 
Laws limiting damages can still comply with Montana’s collateral source 
rule because the identity of the payers could be redacted, or the amount 
could be stipulated by lower courts.  
Justice Shea stated that under Lewis’s logic the only detriment 
suffered by the injured party would be the premiums paid to Blue Cross 
Blue Shield and payroll taxes paid for Medicare, because those are the 
only losses the injured party actually incurred. Lewis disagreed with 
Justice Shea and noted that Meek incurred liability and therefore suffered 
detriment for the amount paid because third party payers could enforce 
liens or subrogation rights against the injured party. Justice Shea 
suggested that damages could be reduced post trial by the amount paid as 
well as the difference in the amount charged and the amount paid, which 
would limit damages to the otherwise recoverable amount. However, 
according to Lewis, Montana’s collateral source rule cannot apply to the 
differing amount because a write-off is not otherwise recoverable—it 
was never incurred. She noted that other courts, including the California 
Supreme Court, have applied this logic.  
Justice Baker asked if the amount charged could be relevant to 
establish the noneconomic damages or the severity of the injury. Lewis 
argued that if the plaintiff is not going to pay or be liable for the full 
amount then the amount charged would not be relevant, but that the 
services provided would be admissible. Therefore, the services could be 
submitted into evidence with the cost and sources of payment redacted. 
Lewis rejected Justice McGrath’s suggestion of using a plaintiff’s expert 
to establish the amount of future or noneconomic damages for amounts 
greater than the amount paid. Lewis argued that it was unreasonable as a 
matter of law to argue that an amount greater than the amount paid was a 
reasonable value of medical expenses in situations where the provider 
accepted less. In today’s medical market, bills are misleading and only 
1–3% of bills charging the full amount are ever collected. Instead, the 
most reliable source of reasonable value is the amount accepted as 
payment.  
Lewis was asked if persons with insurance or access to third 
party payers, like Native Americans using Indian Health Services, would 
be treated differently than persons without insurance. Lewis agreed that 
in a small amount of cases the amount charged would be admissible but 
only when the plaintiff has suffered a concrete economic loss. However, 
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she rejected the idea that different evidentiary standards caused injured 
parties to be treated differently and instead noted that parties would all be 
treated equally because they would all be allowed to recover damages for 
the amount they actually incurred.  
 
III. PREDICTION 
 
The Court seemed persuaded that Judge Oldenburg’s Order 
excluding the amount billed from evidence violated Montana’s common 
law. Several Justices also seemed to agree with the Petitioner that 
allowing the jury to consider the amount billed contradicted Montana’s 
collateral source rule. However, the Court suggested alternatives that 
would allow damages to be reduced by both the amount paid and the 
write-off in post-trial hearings. The Court will have to decide if it has the 
authority to include write-offs in Montana’s collateral source statute. 
Both parties argued that write-offs are not subject to the collateral source 
rule. The Petitioner argued they are not payments and the Respondent 
argued they are not otherwise recoverable. If the Court accepts either 
argument, it seems likely that damages will not be reduced by the write-
off amount. A decision to include the write-off amount in Montana’s 
collateral source statute, and therefore subject it to post-trial reductions, 
is a difficult decision for the Court and may better be left for the 
legislature, as Justice Cotter suggested.  
 
